

Message Text

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-10 IO-13 ISO-00 DPW-01 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03

RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-15 USIA-15 ACDA-19 AID-20

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R 110955Z SEP 73

FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5685

INFO AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY SAIGON

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

USDEL JEC PARIS

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 4649

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR, PFOR, PL, US, VS

SUBJECT: ICCS: MEETING WITH NEW CHIEF OF POLISH DELEGATION

REFS: (A) STATE 179035; (B) SIAGON 16199; (C) WARSAW 4559;

(D) WARSAW 3777

1. SINCE KULAGA LEAVES TODAY FOR SAIGON, SPASOWSKI ASKED ME TO DINNER SEPTEMBER 10. (REF B WAS THUS RECEIVED TOO LATE TO BE USED.) IN ADDITION TO KULAGA, JAN KINAST OF THE AMERICAN DEPARTMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WAS ALSO PRESENT. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS CORIDAL AND BOTH SPASOWSKI AND KULAGA WERE RECEPTIVE TO WHAT I HAD TO SAY.

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2. WHEN I HAD MADE MY PRESENTATION PER REF A,

SPASOWSKI SAID, FIRST, THAT KULAGA HAD THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DETERMINING WHETHER THE SUBREGIONAL TEAMS WOULD RETURN TO THEIR SITES. HE HAD THE AUTHORITY, SPASOWSKI SAID, TO MAKE THIS DECISION ONCE HE HAS REACHED SAIGON AND EVALUATED THE SITUATION ON THE SPOT. SECOND, SPASOWSKI SAID THAT, AS THE POLES HAD NOE IN JULY, THEY WOULD NOW MAKE AN INQUIRY OF THE DRV/VC ABOUT THE SUMS THEY OWE ON THE SECOND TRANCHE. HE REPEATED (REF D) THAT THE POLES HAD NO IDEA HOW EFFECTIVE THEIR JULY INQUIRY HAD BEEN IN GETTING THE DRV/VC TO MAKE THE PAYMENTS THAT HAD THEN BEEN MADE, BUT THEY WOULD UNDERTAKE A NEW INQUIRY. THIRDLY, SPASOWSKI REFERRED TO THE STATEMENT I HAD MADE ABOUT THE CONCERTED EFFORT OF THE PRG/VC TO UNDERMINE THE ICCS THROUGH THE ATTEMPTED REDUCTION OF DELEGATION STAFFS AND THROUGH DEPRIVING IT OF THE REQUISITE FUNDING, NOTING THAT I HAD ASCRIBED TO THE DRV/VC THE INTENTION OF CREATING CONDITIONS AS A CONSEQUENCE OF WHICH THE ICCS WOULD JUST FADE AWAY. HE SAID THAT THE PARIS AGREEMENTS MAKE NO PROVISION FOR THE ICCS " TO FADE AWAY" AND THE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION WAS TO FULLFILL ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE PARIS AGREEMENTS.

3. WITH SPASOWSKI'S APPROVAL, KULAGA THEN SAID THAT HE COULD NOT ADD ANYTHING TO SPASOWSKI'S COMMENTS ON THE POINTS OF SUBSTANCE I HAD MADE. HE WISHED TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE IN THE SPIRIT OF SPASOWSKI'S REMARKS, I.E., HE WAS TO GO TO SAIGON, STUDY THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND, AND THEN MAKE THE NECESSARY DECISIONS TO ENABLE THE POLISH DELEGATION TO FULFILL ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE PARIS AGREEMENTS. HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SUBREGIONAL TEAMS AND WISHED PARTICULARLY TO STUDY THE ICCS'S FINANCIAL SITUATION, IN THE COURSE OF THAT EFFORT, HE WOULD APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY OF CONSULTING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE US GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON, SINCE HAD HAD LEARNED DURING HIS LONG WORK IN MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS THAT "CONSULTATION WAS BETTER THAN CONFRONTATION." HE
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WOULD THEREFORE LOOK FORWARD TO HAVING AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK WITH THE RESPONSIBLE US OFFICIALS AS HE TOOK UP HIS NEW POST.

4. I SAID I WAS SURE THAT AMBASSADOR MARTIN WOULD BE HAPPY TO SEEN HIM AND THAT THE AMBASSADOR AND MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF WOULD BE PREPARED TO DO ANYTHING THEY REASONABLY COULD TO HELP HIM DISCHARGE HIS NEW DUTINES

IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE MANNER. I GAVE KULAGA A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THW WORK OF THE ICCS LIAISON UNIT AND PRATT BYRD'S NAME AS THAT OF ITS CHIEF. KULAGA SAID THAT HE EXPECTED TO CALL SHORTLY ON AMBASSADOR MARTIN AND WOULD SET GREAT STORE BY HIS ABILITY TO CONSULT FREQUENTLY WITH AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES IN SAIGON.

5. SPASOWSKI CLOSED OUR DISCUSSION ON ICCS BY SAYING THAT HE HAD BEEN HELPED GREATLY BY THE EXCHANGES WE HAD HAD HERE IN WARSAW ON MATTERS ARISING FROM POLISH PARTICIPATION IN THE ICCS. WHILE THERE WERE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION BETWEEN US, EACH SIDE AT LEAST UNDERSTOOD THE POSITION OF THE OTHER. SPASOWSKI SAID THAT, IN THE VIEW OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AMBASSADOR KULAGA WAS WITHOUT ANY DOUBT THE BEST MAN THE POLES HAD AVAILABLE FOR THIS RESPONSIBLE ASSIGNMENT. NOT ONLY HAD HE HAD SOME FIFTEEN OR MORE YEARS EXPERIENCE OF MULTILATERAL WORK IN UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS; HE HAD ALSO SERVED IN THE POLISH DELEGATION TO THE ICCS IN LAOS AND THUS HAD SOME KNOWLEDGE OF INDOCHINA. SPASOWSKI CONFIRMED THAT KULAGA'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO "CONSULT, NOT CONFRONT" AND SAID HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CARRY ON THAT CONSULTATION WITH USG OFFICIALS IN SAIGON.

6. COMMENT: UNSPOKEN, BUT CLEARLY IMPLIED, IN SPASOWSKI'S CONCLUDING REMARKS WAS THE SAME IMPLICATION I NOTED IN REF C: THAT KULAGA'S SELECTION REPRESENTED AN EFFORT BY THE POLES TO MINIMIZE DAMAGE TO US-POLISH BILATERAL RELATIONS FROM THE ACTIVITIES OF THE POLISH DELEGATION TO THE ICCS.

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7. I WAS STRUCK BY THE ABSENCE OF OBJECTIVE TO MY STATEMENT THAT THE PRG/VC WERE ENGAGING IN "A CONCERTED EFFORT TO UNDERMINE THE ICCS" AND THE ILLUSTRATIONS I GAVE IN SUPPORTING OF IT. INDEED, THERE WAS NO STATEMENT FROM EITHER SPASOWSKI OR KULAGA WHICH TOOK ISSUE WITH ANY PART OF THE PRESENTATION I MADE. THE ONLY OVERT INDICATION OF THE DELICACY OF THE POLISH POSITION CAME IN THE FORM OF A CHARACTERIZATION OF THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM AS "COMPLEX". END COMMENT.

8. ACTION RECOMMENDED: AMBASSADOR MARTIN, MINISTER APPLING, MR. BYRD, AND OTHER USG OFFICIALS IN SAIGON DEALING WITH THE ICCS PROBLEM SHOULD BE AMONG THE FIRST PEOPLE KULAGA ASKS TO SEE WHEN HE REACHES

SAIGON, IN VIEW OF SPASOWSKI'S STATEMENT THAT
KULAGA WILL HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ORDER THE SUB-
REGIONAL TEAMS BACK TO SITES THEY HAVE ABANDONED, I
RECOMMEND THAT THIS POINT BE VIGOROUSLY PURUED WITH
HIM. HE WILL ALSO BE INTERESTED IN OUR VIEWS ON THE
FINANCIAL SITUATION OF THE ICCS AND FUTURE FISCAL
AND BUDGETARY STEPS NECESSARY TO PERMIT THE COMMISSION
TO ACCOMPLISH ITS TASK.
DAVIES

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